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Abstract 
 
Going beyond source and content pluralism, we propose a two-dimensional audience-
based measure of perceived pluralism by exploiting the practice of ‘social TV’. For this 
purpose, 135.228 tweets related to 30 episodes of prime time political talk shows 
broadcast in Italy in 2014 have been analyzed through supervised sentiment analysis. 
The findings suggest that the two main TV networks compete by addressing generalist 
audiences. The public television offers a plural set of talk shows but ignores the anti-
political audience. The ideological background of the anchorman shapes the audience’s 
perception, while the gender of the guests does not seem to matter. 
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Pluralism is a relevant topic for scholars in media studies and for policy-makers 
(McQuail, 2003; Napoli, 2007). Previous studies evaluated the degree of media 
pluralism focusing mainly on media sources (Baker, 2007) or media content (e.g. 
Aalberg and Curran, 2012; Glasgow Media Group, 1976). The present study, however, 
highlights the importance of considering the role of the audience; focusing on its 
reaction to media content, we shed light on how that content is perceived and digested 
by the audience. 
Accordingly, we develop an audience-based measure of perceived pluralism by 
taking advantage of the so-called ‘social TV’ (e.g. Anstead and O’Loughlin, 2011; 
Deller, 2011; Cameron and Geidner, 2014; Giglietto and Selva, 2014; Guo and Chan-
Olmsted, 2015; Himelboim, 2014; Ianelli and Giglietto 2015; Trilling, 2015), i.e. the 
practice of watching television while using a ‘second screen’ (computer, tablet or 
mobile) to comment and discuss live on the content broadcast on TV. 
For this purpose, we collected and analyzed, through supervised sentiment 
analysis (Ceron et al., 2014), 135.228 tweets related to 30 episodes of 10 prime time 
Italian political talk shows, broadcast in the Fall of 2014.  
Based on these, we assessed the support or opposition of the audience toward 
each of the 95 politicians invited to participate in these shows to build a measure of 
perceived pluralism that focuses on two dimensions: a traditional ideological left-right 
scale and a pro-establishment/anti-establishment dimension; furthermore, we also 
3 
 
provide additional applications of this technique recording the effects of the ideological 
bias of the host (Himelboim, 2014), and potential gaps in the audience evaluation of 
politicians according to their gender (Hetsroni and Lowenstein, 2014). 
The results suggest that RAI and Mediaset (the two main TV networks) compete 
following a kind of Downsian framework, i.e. in order to maximize the audience they 
adopt moderate positions and tend to ‘converge’ toward the rival network, broadcasting 
shows addressed to similar wide generalist audiences. Nevertheless, Berlusconi’s 
Mediaset appeals more to right-wing users while the public television RAI attracts 
moderate as well left-wing users but gets rid of the anti-political audience, which is 
catered by the niche network La7. The public television RAI also tends to offer an 
ideological plural set of talk shows compared to other networks. Finally, the ideological 
background of the anchorman plays a role as we find differences in the shows presented 
by left-wing or right-wing journalists; conversely, the sentiment of comments does not 
seem affected by the gender of the politician suggesting that, compared to men, women 
guests were not particularly put in a bad light during the shows. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next two sections review the literature on 
media pluralism linking it with the role of the audience; then we present the data and the 
methodology adopted; finally we discuss the results and the implications of our 
analysis. 
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Assessing media pluralism 
 
While critical theory’s scholars point the attention to media professionalism 
rather than pluralism, (e.g. Curran, 2002), others retain that media pluralism is crucial 
for democracies: it is often considered as a normative and cultural need (McQuail, 
2003) and as a sign of media quality (Dahl, 1989; McQuail, 1992). These scholars argue 
that the media system (as a whole) should cover a variety of topics and ideas, providing 
room for the opinions of different people. As such, pluralism is considered a benchmark 
to evaluate media systems (Seymoure-Ure, 1974; Hallin and Mancini, 2004). 
In the policy realm, since 1947 the Commission on Freedom of the Press 
(Hutchins Commission) recommended that media should reflect the opinions of relevant 
groups. In 1977, the Annan committee’s report on the future of broadcasting further 
clarifies the importance of media pluralism. Napoli (2007) enucleates the attempts made 
by the American Federal Communication Commission (FCC) to assess the effects of 
rules on content pluralism and in some countries, such as France or Germany, the legal 
system puts emphasis on pluralist interests as key values to ensure good media 
performance (Barendt, 2005). 
Journalists are interested in media pluralism as well, as it represents a key part of 
their code of professional ethics (Hafez, 2002). Finally, media companies, especially 
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Public service broadcasters (Tambini and Cowling, 2004), also aim to evaluate the 
pluralism of the news they provide. 
So far, studies on pluralism focused mainly on source pluralism (pluralism of 
outlets in the media system) or content pluralism. 
On the one hand, the number of television channels and newspapers, the 
concentration of ownership, the intensity of competition, the balance between public 
service broadcasting and commercial enterprises, the existence of independent media 
and the control of advertising revenues (Baker, 2007) were considered as measures of 
source pluralism.  
On the other, scholars gauged pluralism from content analysis of news (e.g. 
Aalberg and Curran, 2012; Glasgow Media Group, 1976) and, in this regard, Hallin and 
Mancini (2004: 29) distinguished internal pluralism (i.e. the heterogeneity of 
viewpoints within a single media outlet) from external pluralism (differentiation 
provided by alternative media outlets). 
Although pluralism is aimed to serve the needs of media users, so far we did not 
find explicit or implicit control of media by the public (van der Wurff, 2011; but see: 
Domingo and Heikkilä, 2012) and the audience is generally excluded from any attempt 
to evaluate pluralism (except in few advisory and non-compulsory bodies: Napoli, 
2007). 
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To fill this gap, our study proposes an audience-based measure of perceived 
pluralism. 
 
Social TV, audience and media pluralism 
 
Evaluating pluralism according to the content broadcast by the media might not 
be sufficient given that different users can perceive the same content in rather different 
ways. Content pluralism, per se, does not tell anything on how the audience will react to 
those plural (or not plural) stimuli. 
In this regard, starting from Hall (1980) and from the related stream of literature 
within cultural studies, several scholars posit that exposure to counter-attitudinal 
information does not imply that citizens will internalize the merit of those arguments 
(Garrett, 2009; Zaller, 1992). Taber and Lodge (2006) argue that consumption of 
incongruent information may even generate an oppositional media hostility effect 
(Arceneaux et al., 2012; Levendusky, 2013), bringing citizens to resist and criticize 
such information. 
Furthermore, by looking at the content alone, we may fail to recognize the 
‘slant’ that can be attached to that content (even in a show that respects formal criteria 
of pluralism); such slant can be better evaluated by looking at the perception of the 
audience, whose response can mirror the content of the show (Ceron and Memoli 2015; 
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Tworzecki and Semetko, 2012), but can also denote a reaction to that (and to the way 
such content is slanted by the medium).  
Indeed social media users, through their second screens, react to the content 
broadcast on TV and comment live on it (Anstead and O’Loughlin, 2011). This means 
that, in such new convergent environment (Jenkins, 2006), produsers (Bruns, 2008) can 
easily and publicly express their point of views, providing original contents that can be 
consumed by other media users (Cameron and Geidner, 2014). Those live comments 
can also be useful to enhance media responsiveness, enabling users to have their say and 
allowing journalists to “feel the pulse” of the audience adjusting the content of the show 
accordingly (Domingo and Heikkilä, 2012: 273). 
In this regard, audience viewpoints become an intriguing, lively and ongoing 
measure of how users perceive and digest the content of the TV shows and a new source 
of information on the degree of (perceived) pluralism.  
So far, several analyses of social TV practices devoted attention to political 
debates. Anstead and O’Loughlin (2011) analyzed the BBC Question Time and used the 
term ‘viewertariat’ referring to citizens that “can use social media to publish and learn 
new information, and engage in discussion” (Anstead and O’Loughlin, 2011: 458). 
Many other studies focused on electoral campaigns, from the US (Freelon and Karpf, 
2015) and Canada (Elmer, 2013) to Europe (Trilling, 2015; Vaccari et al., 2015; 
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Vergeer and Franses, 2016), proving that social TV tools “enable socially mediated and 
networked commentary and conversations on live broadcast events” (Elmer, 2013: 19). 
By analyzing agenda-setting dynamics during the TV debates for the Dutch 2012 
parliamentary elections, Vergeer and Franses (2016) found that the conversations of the 
viewertariat were affected by the issues discussed on TV. Analogously, in the 2013 
German elections Trilling (2015) illustrated that people used Twitter to comment on the 
issues discussed during the TV debate through words related to such debate; 
furthermore, viewers were also partially able to contribute to the public discourse.  
Other scholars focused on talk shows producing similar findings. Larsson (2013: 
147) highlighted that the Twitter activity related to a Swedish talk show was “dependent 
on the broadcasting of the show at hand” and several studies on Italian political talk 
shows proved that Twitter is indeed used to express the viewers’ personal opinions 
(Giglietto and Selva, 2014: 273; Iannelli and Giglietto, 2015; Rossi and Giglietto, 
2016).  
D’heer and Verdegem (2015: 222) investigated comments related to a Belgian 
current affairs programme claiming that Twitter messages are reactive responses to TV 
content and argue that “viewers can publically support, refute or ridicule political actors 
on the TV screen”.  
Finally, two studies based on experiments and survey data highlight the fact that 
TV viewers engage more in social TV when they feel a higher degree of affinity and 
9 
 
involvement with the program itself (Guo and Chan-Olmsted, 2015); furthermore, “the 
opinions expressed by this ‘virtual’ public can influence the home viewer” (Cameron 
and Geidner, 2014: 401). This suggests that online comments can reflect the point of 
view of the audience. 
Summing up, as Deller (2011) argues, Twitter provides the opportunity to 
analyze audience responses to different media stimuli and such information can indeed 
be suitable to evaluate the perceived level of pluralism.  
Taking the cue from this, we propose a method to analyze the tweets published 
by users during the live broadcast of TV shows in order to gauge pluralism between and 
within media companies. 
 
Data and methodology 
 
For this purpose, we employ a modern technique of supervised aggregated 
sentiment analysis (SASA), which produces a better interpretation of social media texts 
and more reliable estimates (Ceron et al., 2016; Hopkins and King, 2010; Jamal et al., 
2015). SASA adopts a two-stage process under the idea that human coders are more 
effective in recognizing all the peculiarities of the language (irony, jargons, neologisms, 
etc.), and can handle the problem of spamming, which affects social media 
conversations (Ceron et al., 2016; Hopkins and King, 2010; Jamal et al., 2015). In the 
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first stage human coders read and classify a subsample of the documents downloaded 
(the ‘training set’). In the second stage, the SASA algorithm uses this training set to 
classify the whole population of texts, providing valid and accurate estimates of the 
distribution of opinions in the aggregate. 
We focus our analysis on the Italian TV system, which has been usually driven 
by a high level of political parallelism (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). The history of Italian 
television, in fact, is deeply intertwined with domestic politics. This holds true for both 
the two main TV networks (which account for around 80 percent of nationwide 
audience: AGCOM, 2016).  
On the one hand, the Italian public television RAI has been always controlled by 
ruling parties, although the control of one TV channel was usually granted to opposition 
parties (Mancini, 2009). Spoil system strategies were adopted after every adjustment in 
the government coalition. This affected the appointments of RAI managers and 
anchormen, but also the allocation of time among different parties in TV news or shows 
(Mazzoleni et al., 2011). 
On the other hand, the private broadcasting group Mediaset, which is the main 
rival of RAI, is owned by the founder of the centre-right coalition, Silvio Berlusconi 
(who served for three terms as prime minister), and therefore Mediaset is tied to politics 
too. 
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To evaluate perceived pluralism we monitor Italian political talk shows 
broadcast in the Fall of 2014 to build a two-dimensional space (Tworzecki and 
Semetko, 2012). From September to November we analyzed comments published on 
Twitter that were related to 10 prime time talk shows: Ballarò (host: Massimo 
Giannini), Di Martedì (Giovanni Floris), La Gabbia (Gianluigi Paragone), Matrix (Luca 
Telese), Ottoemezzo (Lilli Grüber), Piazzapulita (Corrado Formigli), Porta a Porta 
(Bruno Vespa), Quinta Colonna (Paolo Del Debbio), Servizio Pubblico (Michele 
Santoro) and Virus (Nicola Porro). Three of them (Ballarò, Porta a Porta, Virus) were 
broadcast by the three major channels of the public service television RAI (one talk per 
each channel); other two (Matrix and Quinta Colonna) were broadcast by Berlusconi’s 
Mediaset; the remaining five (Di Martedì, La Gabbia, Ottoemezzo, Piazzapulita and 
Servizio Pubblico) were broadcast by a smaller private television, La7, which offers a 
wide coverage of political news. We randomly selected one week per month and, during 
that week, we collected the comments published during the live tweeting (from the 
beginning until one hour after the scheduled ending of the show). The comments were 
downloaded through a set of keywords containing the name of the talk show or the 
hashtags commonly used to comment on it, as well as the names of the presenter and 
those of the invited politicians. 
Tweets have been retrieved from the Twitter search Application Programming 
Interface (API). Due to the limitations imposed on the Twitter API (at that time there 
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was a limit of 1,000 tweets delivered per each keyword, in each call) it is hard to gather 
the whole population of tweets, however, some strategies can partially overcome these 
limits (Sampson et al., 2015). In detail, repeated calls were formulated by combining the 
name of the show and the names of the guests. By doing that, and given the relatively 
low number of tweets published, on average, about each show (Giglietto and Selva, 
2014; Rossi and Giglietto, 2016) we can assume that our sample approaches the whole 
population of comments. 
Overall, 30 episodes were considered and 135.228 tweets were collected and 
analyzed. With respect to the content of these tweets, on the one hand, we found some 
comments that indirectly express ‘videomalaise’ (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997) 
suggesting that “On #Matrix politicians only make a chaotic mess”; users compared talk 
shows to a “chicken coop” or a “sheepfold”, in which “there is no dialog and it is 
impossible to understand anything” because “politicians are only shouting”, 
emphasizing the fact that “satirical shows like #Gazebo broadcast news while talk 
shows like #quintacolonna do not and only fuel the worst instincts”, up to the point that 
someone complains saying that “Politics is responsible for such dirty and disgusting 
things. We’re sick and tired #Quintacolonna”. On the other hand, however, we also 
found comments expressing approval for the debate (“@corradoformigli @ale_moretti 
@GiorgiaMeloni engaging, interesting and reflective show! What a nice episode 
#piazzapulita” and “burning topic but the episode came together beautifully! 
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#quintacolonna”) and many users directly discussed the issues that were debated during 
the show. 
In particular, the audience reacts to the content of the talk show by agreeing or 
disagreeing with what has been said (D’heer and Verdegem, 2015) and by supporting or 
criticizing the different policy stances expressed by the guests of the show (see below). 
Accordingly, we take into account the support or opposition expressed on social media 
toward the 95 politicians invited to participate in these shows. 
In the first stage a total number of 17.800 tweets, around 600 per episode, have 
been codified in order to create the training set, which has been used to estimate the 
distribution of opinions in the whole population of tweets.1 
As first, we create a measure of the average political/ideological views of the 
audience, i.e. something that resembles the traditional left-right scale. 
Despite the rise of the anti-establishment Five Stars Movement (M5S), in the 
Fall of 2014, Italian political talk shows were still based on a bipolar format. Only 
politicians belonging to the main left-leaning (e.g. Democratic Party, PD) or right-
leaning (e.g. Forza Italia, FI) parties were invited and little or no room was available to 
third-parties, including to representatives of the M5S, whose participation in TV shows 
was forbidden by the M5S leader, Beppe Grillo. Accordingly, we classified politicians 
in two categories, left and right, based on their political affiliation.  
14 
 
To distinguishing talk shows that are addressed to a left-leaning audience from 
those addressed to a right-leaning audience we measured the share of positive, negative 
and neutral sentiment expressed toward each of them.2 For instance, we considered as 
expression of agreement (positive sentiment) tweets such as “concerning the battles to 
fight in the European Union, well done Moretti! She made a concise but very clear 
comment on taxes and bureaucracy” (supporting Alessandra Moretti, PD, during 
Piazzapulita) or “I’ve just listened to the only relevant speech on Europe by 
@GiorgiaMeloni, well done!!!” (supporting the right leaning Giorgia Meloni, during the 
same show) and “The passionate @BiancofioreMiky demolished the polite 
@simonabonafe on the TV ring of Quinta Colonna where Miky confirmed she is 
determined and competent” (supporting Michaela Biancofiore, FI, during Quinta 
Colonna). 
Conversely, we classified as expression of disagreement (negative sentiment) 
comments such as “Oh My God!! #Toti just said that Spain reaps the benefits of Rajoy’s 
labor market reforms! That’s untrue, unemployment has increased #matrix5” 
(criticizing Giovanni Toti, FI, during Matrix) or “Giorgia Meloni on Quinta Colonna 
talks about how to solve the problems of social housing… But she is subservient just like 
anyone else” (criticizing Meloni during Quinta Colonna) and “@orfini @RaiBallaro 
unfortunately @orfini doesn’t know the difference between job insecurity and equal 
treatment” (criticizing Matteo Orfini, PD, during Ballarò). 
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Per each talk, we subtracted the average share of positive sentiment of left-wing 
politicians from the average share of positive sentiment of right-wing politicians: 
positive values indicate that right-wing politicians obtain, on average, a higher degree of 
positive sentiment compared to left-wing politicians; negative values indicate that the 
audience expresses more support for left-wing politicians. 
The traditional left-right scale is still important to discriminate policy positions 
and to evaluate the degree of pluralism, but it may not be the only relevant dimension of 
conflict. For instance, in the Italian context (but also in other political systems), a 
second dimension can be useful to detect anti-political and populist attitudes represented 
by anti-establishment parties such as the M5S. Such dimension evaluates the closeness 
or distance of the audiences from the political system as a whole, measuring the 
legitimization they attribute to politics and politicians (indeed negative comments 
accused politicians of being deceitful or unqualified person and criticized their policy 
views by showing them – sometimes all of them – in a bad light). As such, we can 
sketch the degree of pluralism also in terms of lower and higher opposition to the 
political system. 
To discriminate between media outlets on this second dimension we focused on 
the share of negative sentiment. We measured the average value of negative sentiment 
expressed by the audience towards all the politicians’ opinions and performances. 
Lower values indicate a low degree of negativity towards politics and distinguish talk 
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shows whose audience is supportive of the political system. Higher values indicate a 
heightened degree of negativity and allow distinguishing talk shows preferred by an 
anti-political audience. 
 
Results and findings 
 
Figure 1 displays the standardized position of the audience of each show on the 
two dimensions. The positioning of the audience is coherent with previous studies on 
the slant of TV networks: the show with the most left-wing audience is Servizio 
Pubblico (La7) hosted by Santoro, one of the most tenacious anti-Berlusconi journalists 
(Hibberd, 2007; Stille, 2006). But also Ottoemezzo (La7) and Ballarò, broadcast by RAI 
3, the public channel traditionally considered as left-leaning (Durante and Knight, 2012; 
Hibberd, 2007; Stille, 2006) appear to attract a left-wing audience. On the left, we find 
the audiences of other two La7 shows, Piazzapulita and Di Martedì, which were 
respectively presented by Formigli (former colleague of Santoro) and Floris (former 
anchorman of Ballarò). Conversely, on the right side we find the audiences of two 
shows transmitted by Berlusconi’s Mediaset, which is right-leaning network (Anderson 
and McLaren, 2012; Durante and Knight, 2012; Hibberd, 2007), as well as that of Porta 
a Porta, which is broadcast by RAI 1, the public channel traditionally more supportive 
of moderate and conservative views (Durante and Knight, 2012). 
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On the second dimension, La Gabbia has the most anti-political audience, while 
Porta a Porta has the least anti-political one.3 
 
FIGURE 1: HERE 
 
Figure 2 displays the position of the audiences of the three TV companies. Here 
we distinguish the ‘reservation area’ of each network (the area in which we collocate the 
TV users that are more willing to watch the shows broadcast by that network). 
For this purpose, we report a Voronoi diagram (Okabe et al., 2000), which is a 
partition of the space into regions such that each region is associated with a unique 
‘generating point’ and any point in the region is closer to that region’s generating point 
compared to the generating point of any other region. In our case, the generating points 
are the average positions of audiences of the three TV companies, and the set of points 
in each region are the positions of hypothetical TV users. Any TV user in a given region 
is closer to the position of that region’s TV network than to any other TV network and 
therefore more willing to watch the shows broadcast by that network. 
 
FIGURE 2: HERE  
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This diagram reveals how media outlets have shaped the market. Although we 
observe a multi-actor competition in a two dimensional space, a context which lies apart 
from the assumptions of Downs’ (1957) theory, this picture suggests that RAI and 
Mediaset (the two main TV networks) compete following a kind of Downsian 
framework: they tend to converge toward the rival network, adopting moderate 
positions (on average they are slightly conservative and slightly pro-system), and are 
indeed located close to each other in both dimensions. This scenario of competition is 
coherent with Auditel data on the viewership, according to which RAI and Mediaset are 
two giants of similar dimensions that control a wide majority of viewership (Durante 
and Knight, 2012). Conversely, La7 is a niche network which retains a small share of 
the market (around 3-4%) and indeed La7 seems to address niche TV users that are 
located away from the centre of the two-dimensional space. In particular, La7 attracts an 
audience which is more left-wing or anti-political, while overall RAI and Mediaset tend 
to broadcast show addressed to similar generalist audiences.4 Even so, RAI gathers the 
interest of left-wing and centrist TV users and Berlusconi’s Mediaset attracts right-wing 
ones.  
These results can also shed light on the degree of perceived pluralism that exists 
within each media company and in the whole media system. First, the public service 
broadcaster RAI is perceived to present a pluralist offer on the left-right ideological 
spectrum, ranging from left (Ballarò) to right (Porta a Porta). Conversely, on the first 
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dimension, each of the two other networks presents shows addressed to very similar 
audiences and does not try to cover the whole spectrum of political views. Indeed, the 
range between the most left-wing and right-wing shows is markedly higher for RAI 
(2.53), compared to La7 (1.04) and Mediaset (0.40). However, on the second 
dimension, RAI does not try to attract the anti-political audience at all and offers shows 
perceived as pro-system oriented. On this latter dimension, a degree of pluralism within 
the media system is provided thanks to La7, which appeals to anti-political media 
consumers and allows critical voices to be heard in the media system. The impact of 
La7 in terms of audience share is obviously lower than Mediaset and RAI. Nevertheless, 
La7 provides room for different ideas and opinions. On the whole, regardless of 
broadcasters’ ratings, it seems that media users perceive the existence of pluralism as 
they can find, across networks, a number of shows addressed to different audiences. 
 
Comparison with other data 
Our results are in line with the traditional tendency of RAI to cover the whole 
spectrum of political parties (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Mancini, 2009) offering a 
variety of contents. Our findings are also coherent with a recent survey on the political 
attitudes of the audience of TV networks (Barisione et al., 2014), which reveal that La7 
attracts a more left-wing audience as well as an anti-political one, Mediaset attracts a 
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right-wing viewership (but also anti-political TV users), while RAI seems more 
moderate (except RAI 3, which has a left-wing audience). 
Measuring pluralism by simply counting the difference between the number of 
left-wing and right-wing guests invited by each TV network would reveal some 
similarities too: La7 invited more left-wing than right-wing politicians (24 against 18), 
while RAI (13 against 16) and Mediaset (10 against 12) were more balanced, though 
with a slight prevalence of right-wing guests. This more traditional measure of left-right 
pluralism is somewhat correlated (r = 0.65) with the results of sentiment analysis. 
However, we also notice a few important discrepancies. For instance, Ballarò and 
Ottoemezzo formally respected pluralism criteria as they invited a balanced number of 
guests retaining different ideological views. Despite this, left-wing oriented audiences 
are more attracted by the content of these two shows confirming that objective criteria 
to evaluate pluralism do not necessarily mirror audience perceptions. This is even more 
evident if we consider that, despite the lack of any anti-establishment guest in the Fall 
of 2014, political talk shows also catered to an anti-establishment audience. This 
highlights a very important consequence that underpins our approach, suggesting that it 
can allow us to monitor a variety of perspectives: going beyond the mere content 
broadcast by the TV program it catches how that content has been perceived and 
digested by the audience. 
 
21 
 
The role of editors and anchormen 
Overall, our results suggest that, in addressing the audience, talk shows follow 
the interests of the network and those of the owner/editor (Anderson and McLaren, 
2012), as Berlusconi’s Mediaset appeals to right-wing users and the public television 
RAI is perceived as avoiding anti-political contents. 
But the ideological background of journalists matters too (Baron, 2006). We 
classified journalists in two categories (left-leaning and right-leaning hosts), according 
to their political affiliation or past activism/work in newsmedia clearly slanted to the 
left/right (Himelboim, 2014).5 We find a statistically significant difference (99% level 
of confidence) between the average left-right position of the shows presented by left-
wing (-0.55) or right-wing (0.83) hosts. This means that the anchorman’s ideology 
slants the content and therefore has an impact on the public’s perception, shaping the 
composition of the audience.  
The fact that talk shows are, to a certain extent, ideologically slanted also 
emerges from a more qualitative reading of the tweets as some of them explicitly 
criticize the anchorman (or the show itself) for not being neutral; for instance, with 
respect to left-leaning anchormen/shows we find comments wondering whether 
“shouldn’t #ballarò be neutral? It’s more pro-government than the premier Renzi 
himself. Giannini is opening the way to the PD” or arguing that “#MassimoGiannini 
and the whole #Ballarò newsroom just aim to put FI in a bad light”. The same holds for 
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right-leaning anchormen/shows as Twitter users notice that “Del Debbio was the first to 
let the crowd speak? But #quintacolonna didn’t do that when Berlusconi was in power, 
you figure out why” and “only simpletons or unsavory people can believe in the racist 
propaganda broadcast by shows like #quintacolonna”. 
These results highlight, once again, the weaknesses of objective measures of 
pluralism that do not take into account the slant of media and the audience’s 
subjective perception of such slant. 
 
Additional applications: The gender of guests 
The same analysis can also allow us to discuss other potential dimensions of 
pluralism such as those related to the representation of gender roles in the media or the 
fairness of the portrayal of ethnic groups to assess whether there is a bias in the 
sentiment expressed toward minorities. Here we will show a further application 
focusing on the gender of politicians. A mere count of guests highlights that men (66) 
outnumber women (28), though the share of women (30%) is consistent with their share 
of seats in the National Parliament. As such, one can argue that talk shows are balanced 
and they only perpetuate gender inequalities that exist elsewhere (Baitinger, 2015). 
However, our data go further and illustrate that there is no bias in the perception of the 
audience about the representation of gender roles portrayed by talk shows. Despite talk 
shows have occasionally been accused of devaluing the role of women in politics (for a 
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review: Hetsroni and Lowenstein, 2014; for a recent example about Italy: Cruccu, 2014) 
and despite the fact that there is a prevalence of males commenting on them, we did not 
find any statistically significant difference in the tone of the comments related to male 
(22.9% of positive sentiment) or female (20.8% of positive sentiment) guests (for a 
similar result: Hetsroni and Lowenstein, 2014). This suggests that audience’s 
perceptions are not affected by the gender of the guest; according to the judgment of 
Twitter users, women guests were not put in a bad light during the shows (compared to 
men) and this seems to imply the existence of a gender balance. 
 
Conclusion and implications 
 
Using the practice of social TV, this paper has investigated the degree of 
perceived pluralism provided by Italian political talk shows in the Fall of 2014 focusing 
on the live reaction of audience to the content broadcast during the shows. We collected 
and analyzed the comments published on Twitter by the audience of 10 prime time talk 
shows during 30 different episodes. This information has been analyzed through 
supervised sentiment analysis in order to estimate the average position of the audience. 
By analyzing the degree of positive and negative sentiment expressed toward the 
95 politicians that were invited in the shows, we managed to build a two-dimensional 
space (Tworzecki and Semetko, 2012) measuring whether each talk addressed a left-
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wing or right-wing audience (on the left-right scale) and a pro-political or anti-political 
audience (on the pro-system/anti-system scale). 
In line with a recent surveys (Barisione et al., 2014), our results depict a media 
system in which the two main giants, RAI and Mediaset, compete according to a 
Downsian framework by broadcasting, on average, generalist talk shows. The main 
difference between the two is that RAI ends up attracting a more left-wing audience, 
while Mediaset focuses on the right-wing one. RAI also tends to offer an ideologically 
plural set of talk shows. Conversely, the offer of the smaller private network, La7, is 
more oriented toward an anti-political audience.  
Our results suggest that, across media networks, there exists a variety of shows 
appealing to different audiences, though we also notice that – for some shows – 
reaching objective criteria of pluralism was not sufficient to produce analogous 
perceptions within the audience. With respect to left-right political views, it is the public 
service broadcaster RAI that fulfills the task of guaranteeing pluralism. Conversely, on 
the pro-system/anti-system dimension, the niche network La7 allows anti-political 
voices to be heard and provides talk shows suitable for such anti-system audience. This 
result is partially in contrast with two widely used press freedom indexes that criticize 
the Italian media system.6 Conversely, our research underlines that – even in the highly 
concentrated mainstream TV field and despite the political control exerted on Italian 
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television (or partially also due to that: Mancini, 2009) – there is room for a significant 
external pluralism (that also includes anti-establishment views).  
Finally, our results also suggest that the host of the talk show can play a role, as 
we find a statistically significant difference in the left-right placement of talk shows 
presented by left-wing or right-wing journalists; conversely, the gender of politicians 
did not affect the perception of the audience. 
Compared to other methods commonly used to evaluate pluralism, the technique 
proposed in the present paper presents some peculiar features. First, it is entirely based 
on the people’s perception of the content broadcast by the shows; therefore it is suitable 
to assess the effect that media produce on the audience. In this regard, it becomes an 
alternative way to look at media pluralism. This point is rather important in light of the 
concepts of ‘oppositional media hostility’ (Arceneaux et al., 2012; Levendusky, 2013) 
and ‘motivated skepticism’ (Taber and Lodge ,2006). In fact, these studies suggest that 
the content spread by the media (and the pluralism of such content) is no longer the only 
relevant thing to care about; conversely, we should also look at the reaction of the users 
to observe how media consumers perceive and digest such content: indeed in our 
analysis we found a few comments written by users that resisted and criticized the 
information broadcast on TV highlighting a certain degree of oppositional media 
hostility. 
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The technique here proposed is not time consuming and can provide results 
almost in real time (Elmer, 2013), thereby allowing TV networks to adjust the frame of 
the show live, providing room for participatory practices (Bruns, 2008; Jenkins, 2006) 
that have the potential to generate an empowerment of the audience. Journalists, in fact, 
can profitably use such indicator of the perceptions of TV users to “feel their pulse” 
and, by including Twitter audience’s feedback into the program (Cameron and Geidner, 
2014), they can enhance media responsiveness (Domingo and Heikkilä, 2012). 
By evaluating how the audience reacts to the content of the talk shows (also in 
terms of who has been invited), this technique can be useful to public authorities that 
want to monitor perceptions on media pluralism, or private companies interested in the 
opinions of consumers.  
The present study has implications for the analysis of media bias (e.g. 
Groseclose and Milyo, 2005) or audience fragmentation (e.g. Webster, 2005). It also 
contributes to the academic and non-academic debate on the potential polarizing effect 
of cable television (e.g. Iyengar and Hahn, 2009), which lowers the incentives to offer 
catchall talk shows.  
In line with the literature on social TV (Anstead and O’Loughlin, 2011; Elmer, 
2013; Freelon and Karpf, 2015; Larsson, 2013; Trilling, 2015; Vergeer and Franses, 
2016), we observed that Twitter users commented live, expressing personal opinions 
that were related to the content of the show itself (D’heer and Verdegem, 2015; 
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Giglietto and Selva, 2014; Iannelli and Giglietto, 2015) and therefore seems to represent 
a fruitful source to analyze the perception of the audience and its reaction to that 
content. 
However, based on the content of tweets, we also noticed that some users dislike 
the image of politics broadcast by talk shows; this can generate negativity and cynicism 
among the audience. On the whole, however, the existence of a certain degree of 
criticism toward politicians seems partially compensated by several positive comments. 
In this regard, future research could employ SASA to focus more deeply on 
videomalaise and political trust (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997) investigating to what 
extent these TV debates can generate distrust. 
The study has some limitations though. The main one is represented by the fact 
that Twitter users may not be representative of the whole audience of talk shows. On 
Twitter there is a prevalence of younger, highly-educated males, concentrated in urban 
areas that are more politically active and more interested in politics (Vaccari et al., 
2013). More politically interested citizens, however, are also more likely to consume 
news (Strömbäck, Djerf-Pierre and Shehata, 2013) and watch political talk shows 
commenting on Twitter (Vaccari et al., 2015); this fact can partially attenuate the socio-
demographic differences with the audience. Nevertheless, it could be argued that, being 
more engaged in politics, Twitter users are also more extremists and polarized. 
However, our results suggest that – despite the ideological differences between the 
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audiences of each show – on the whole we do not find many fringe shows that are 
watched only by a wide extremist audience. Furthermore, we know that although 
Twitter users are not representative of a country’s population, they can act like opinion-
makers (for a discussion of the potential influence of social TV: Cameron and Geidner, 
2014) becoming representative of larger streams of conversations. In this regard, 
previous studies have shown that TV viewers engage more in social TV when they feel 
a higher degree of affinity and involvement with the program itself (Guo and Chan-
Olmsted, 2015). This seems to suggest that those commenting on Twitter can indeed be 
representative of the viewpoints of the ‘core’ audience of the show. What is more, the 
analysis of social media comments will become more and more interesting as the 
number of viewers engaged in social TV will grow.  
The choice to dichotomize the political affiliation of the guests into ‘left’ and 
‘right’ and to simplify the reaction of the audience distinguishing between ‘agreement’ 
and ‘disagreement’ can be a limitation too. However, SASA also allows to consider the 
intensity of positive and negative comments; analogously, in more polarized contexts, 
the opinions of the audience can be weighted according to more fine grained measures 
of the political ideology of the guests. 
The analysis is based on a single case study and this represents another 
limitation. As such, future research could investigate differences across media systems 
(Hallin and Mancini, 2004) to expand the generalizability of our findings and to shed 
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light on the role played by public television compared to free private networks or pay 
TV in other countries. This method can also be applied to analyze the reaction and the 
perceptions of the audience in countries with a less free media environment, in which 
we could expect to find a higher degree of hostile media bias compared to the present 
case. 
                                                 
1 The supervised analysis allowed us also to get rid of the noise produced by the staff of 
politicians and by the official accounts of the shows. These tweets, which were 
generally just a propagation of the exact statements pronounced by the guests without 
any additional original content, have been classified in an ad-hoc Off-topic category (i.e. 
tweets not relevant with respect to the analysis). The same applies to noise due to 
retrieval of hashtags and keywords that are also common words (e.g. Matrix). The Off-
topic category represents approximately the 50% of the training set. 
2 The accuracy has been assessed on a subsample of 8000 tweets related to 7 guests 
(Alfano, Cofferati, De Micheli, Meloni, Moretti, Orfini, Toti). Compared to handcoded 
documents, the root mean square error of the estimates is on average 2.8%. 
3 These results seem reliable too: Porta a Porta is almost considered as an institutional 
arena and the show is also called “the third Chamber”, while La Gabbia adopts a sort of 
populist format, in which politicians are put in the middle of the room, in a kind of cage, 
and are subjected to the judgment of the public. 
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4 Considering the unstandardized positions of the TV networks produces the same 
results: RAI’s and Mediaset’s talk shows are addressed to generalist and centrist 
audiences (though RAI also catches the left-wing audience and Mediaset the right-wing 
one), while La7 deviates from the centre of the space to cater to an anti-political 
audience. 
5 We classified as left-wing anchors Santoro and Grüber (former members of the 
European Parliament affiliated with the Party of European Socialists), Telese (former 
head of the official newspaper of the Communist Refounding Party), Giannini (former 
head of the left-wing newspaper La Repubblica), as well as Floris and Formigli, self-
defined as ‘left-wing journalist’ (for a similar operationalization: Himelboim, 2014). 
6 See Freedom House (https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/italy) or 
Reporters Without Borders (https://rsf.org/en/italy). 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Placement of the audience of each talk on the two-dimensional space 
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Figure 2: Average placement of the audience of TV networks and ‘reservation 
area’ of each network 
 
